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COMMENTS
MANDATORY INTERVENTION: EXPANSION OF
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN FAVOR OF
SINGLE DEFENDANTS AGAINST
MULTIPLE PLAINTIFFS
IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court's reasoning concerning
the issue of non-assertion of the right to intervene in federal
lawsuits has gradually changed over the last forty-six years.'
This change in reasoning is due to the increasing number of lawsuits fied in the federal district courts. 2 The 1966 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 3 addressed this
1. The first case to establish a rule concerning this issue was Chase
Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431 (1934). In Chase, Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority, stated that:
[t]he law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a
hearing the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a
stranger.... Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a
person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein
will not affect his legal rights.
Id. at 441. In 1968, Justice Harlan, writing for the majority in Provident
Tradesmens Bank &Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968), suggested
that a recalcitrant intervenor might "be bound by the previous decision because, although technically a nonparty, he had purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity to intervene." Id. at 114. Most recently, in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), Justice Stewart applied a procedural penalty for failure to intervene in certain situations. Id. at 331. See
notes 16-22 and accompanying text infra.
2. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts 308 (1979). For a general discussion of additional effects the increasing caseload has had on the federal district courts, see Fish,
The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of FederalJudicialAdministration, 37
U. Cm. L. REV. 203 (1970) (each judicial counsel shall make all necessary
orders for the effective and expeditious administration of the business of
the courts); Fish, Crises,Politics, and FederalJudicialReform: The Administrative Office Act of 1939, 32 J. PoL. 599 (1970) (analysis of an act enacted

for the benefit of the administration of United States courts); Hart, Foreword: The Time Chartof the Justices, 73 HAuv. L. REV. 84 (1959) (analysis of

the time available to United States Supreme Court Justices); Chief Justice
Warren, Administrative Problems of the Federal Judiciary,23 Bus. LAw. 7

(1967) (noting the extrajudicial functions of federal judges); Note, The Second Circuit FederalJudicialAdministration in Microcosm, 63 COLUM. L.

REV. 874 (1963) (statistical analysis of the caseload of the federal courts).
3. FED. R. Crv. P. for the United States District Courts, as amended,
Feb. 28, 1966.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:441

issue by establishing liberalized joinder provisions for the federal courts. 4 A major purpose of the liberalized joinder provisions is the resolution of all potential claims by all potential
parties in one lawsuit.5 An absent plaintiff who possesses a
right to intervene in federal civil litigation, however, can wastefully prolong rather than help to expeditiously resolve disputes
involving multiple plaintiffs and a single defendant.
The prolongation of such suits has resulted because the current state of the law 6 has made the following statements true: if
there are two potential plaintiffs and one potential defendant in
a legal dispute, and only one of the plaintiffs initiates a lawsuit
against the defendant, the remaining plaintiff has everything to
gain and nothing to lose by not effectuating joinder in the initial
lawsuit.7 If the remaining plaintiff brings a second suit against
the defendant, he will not be bound by a judgment favoring the
defendant in the prior suit. 8 The plaintiff will, however, be unable to estop the defendant from relitigating any unfavorable
judgments in the prior suit.9
The imbalance in this situation is compounded by the
number of potential plaintiffs involved. For example, in a lawsuit that is structured with fifty plaintiffs sharing a common
claim against a single defendant,' 0 assume that after the initial
4.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 13(h), 14(a)(b), 18(a)(b), 19(a)(b), 20(a), 22, 23, and

24.
5. See generally McCoid, A Single Packagefor Multiparty Disputes, 28
L. REV. 707 (1976). Additionally, the joinder provisions, as well as all

STAN.

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, can only be utilized to the extent
their application is fair to all parties involved. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
6. See notes 78-105 and accompanying text infra.
7. Id.

8. See notes 33-38 and accompanying text infra.
9. While the validity of this statement is lessened somewhat due to the
recent decision of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979),
pragmatically speaking the statement is correct. See notes 78-105 and accompanying text infra.

10. Lawsuits producing great numbers of potential plaintiffs against a
single defendant are much less common than lawsuits producing ten or
fewer plaintiffs against a single defendant. Nevertheless, the former situation has occurred several times. Such situations usually occur as a result of
a "mass accident." A mass accident is defined as a sudden, unintentional
occurrence causing harm to many persons or their property for which other

persons may be legally responsible. Comment, Mass Accident Class Ac-

tions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 1616-17 (1972). The claims in mass accident
litigation usually involve wrongful death or personal injuries. See Hobbs v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Additionally, Professor

Currie demonstrated how a railroad accident could give rise to such massive tort litigation. Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 304 (1957). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). Finally, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois is currently handling a
form of this type of massive tort litigation due to the air disaster precipi-
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suit is filed, the remaining forty-nine plaintiffs bring their actions one by one. Each plaintiff will wait for a determination in
the prior action before filing his own lawsuit. If the defendant
prevails in the first twenty-five suits, the remaining twenty-five
plaintiffs will be unaffected by the defendant's victories, even
though their claims are the same as those of the losing plaintiffs." If the defendant loses suit number twenty-six, however,
plaintiffs twenty-seven through fifty are automatically win12
ners.
Under current federal law, the defendant cannot assert a
winning judgment against a nonparty plaintiff, but a losing judgment automatically renders the defendant liable to plaintiffs initiating future suits based on the same cause of action in the
prior suits. 13 This subjects the defendant to both the possibility
of collusion among the plaintiffs 14 and the burden of defending
against claims and relitigating issues upon which the defendant
has previously litigated against and prevailed.' 5 Therefore, in
such situations plaintiffs have at least two, and possibly more
chances to prevail against the defendant. The plaintiffs need
win only once, while the defendant must win every time.
The United States Supreme Court first confronted the issue
of recalcitrant-plaintiff intervenors in Chase National Bank v.
City of Norwalk 16 where the Court rejected the argument that a
7
litigant is required to exercise a right of federal intervention.'
The next time the Court significantly addressed this issue was
thirty-four years later in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Patterson.8 In Provident, Justice Harlan suggested that a
tated by the crash of American Airlines Flight 191. In re Air Crash Disaster

Near Chicago Illinois on May 25, 1979, No. 80-1812 (N.D. Ill. 1979). This air
crash led to 158 cases being ified in federal district courts throughout the

United States. All cases were consolidated in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
11. This result is in accordance with the principles of offensive collateral
estoppel. See notes 62-71 and accompanying text infra and note 8 and accompanying text supra.
12. Although Parklane attempted to avoid this result, pragmatically it is
not likely to do so. See notes 78-105 and accompanying text infra.
13. Id.
14. There is no legal basis to prevent the plaintiffs from agreeing to sue
the defendant successively in an attempt to establish, somewhere throughout the course of the lawsuits, the defendant's liability by mere chance; i.e.,
in all likelihood, the defendant will lose one lawsuit out of fifty.
15. Since each new lawsuit would necessarily try the same legal and
factual issues as the prior lawsuits, the defendant would be subjected to
this wasteful repetition as long as he kept winning and the supply of plaintiffs held out.
16. 291 U.S. 431 (1934).
17. Id. at 441.
18. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
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disputant who had not intervened in an initial lawsuit might "be
bound by the previous decision because, although technically a
nonparty, he had purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity
to intervene." 19 Although few courts followed this idea, 20 the
current members of the Supreme Court have recently shown
sensitivity to these issues in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.21
The Parklane case, however, strongly indicates that judicial de22
velopments in this area are merely in the preliminary stages.
Therefore, further attention to the problem of nonintervening
federal plaintiffs is necessary.
This comment will demonstrate how plaintiffs who possess
a federal right of intervention, but who knowingly forego a reasonable opportunity to exercise that right, can do so without
fear of preclusion in subsequent relitigation of issues determined in the initial action. 23 Examination of the various approaches that have either been judicially applied or proposed by
other commentators will then be made. 24 Finally, the development of a new approach which logically flows from existing law
will be structured. 25 Full understanding of the issues necessitates a preliminary discussion of the relationships between the
procedural concepts involved.
DEVICES DESIGNED TO PROMOTE THE PRINCIPLES OF
JUDICIAL ECONOMY AND FINALITY

Intervention
Intervention is a procedural device which allows the scope
of the litigation to be expanded.2 6 A nonparty can join as a party
to an existing lawsuit on his own initiative if certain tests are
19. Id. at 114.
20. Few lower court decisions since Provident have followed Justice
Harlan's suggestion. See Consumers Union, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. GTE
Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 441 U.S. 942 (1979);
Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States District Court, 523 F.2d 1073,
1077 (9th Cir. 1975); Show-World Center, Inc. v. Walsh, 438 F. Supp. 642, 648
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 254 (E.D. Ark.), affd per
curiam, 393 U.S. 14 (1968). There are a few cases, however, which have followed the principle, at least partially, by refusing to allow assertion of collateral estoppel. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448, 452
(D.D.C. 1978); cf.EEOC v. Huttig Sash &Door Co., 371 F. Supp. 848, 851 (S.D.
Ala. 1974) (assertion of collateral estoppel barred due to lack of notice),
rev'd on other grounds, 511 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1975).
21. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
22. See notes 78-105 and accompanying text infra.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
See notes 106-11 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 113-35 and accompanying text infra.
See F. JAMES, CrVIL PROCEDURE § l.IV, at 617-21 (1965).
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met. Nonstatutory intervention 27 in federal civil litigation is es2
tablished by meeting the tests set forth in FRCP 24(a) (2). 8

Upon timely application, FRCP 24(a) (2) gives a nonparty a right
to intervene if each of the following three tests is satisfied: (1)
he has an interest relating to the property or transaction involved in the action; (2) disposition of the action may impair or
impede his ability to protect his interest as a practical matter;
and (3) his interest is not adequately represented by present
29
parties.

FRCP 24 was established for the following purposes: to allow one, not a party to an existing lawsuit, to protect himself
from exclusion in an action; to protect the nonparty from exclusion in an action where he might inexpensively litigate his claim
and to resolve the claims of all potential parties in one lawsuit,
27. Federal rule of civil procedure 24 reads, in relevant part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United
States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action ... may impair or impede his ability to protect that interest,
unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing
parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United
States confers a conditional right to intervene; or
(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a
question of law or fact in common.... [i] n exercising its discretion the
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24, as amended, July 1, 1975. In all federal actions, rule 24 and
not the state law governs intervention. McDonald v. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d
1065, 1070 (5th Cir. 1970).
Both rule 24(a) (1) and 24(b) (1) statutory intervention usually involve
intervention by the United States or a state in a case involving the constitutionality of an Act of Congress or a state statute. 7A WIGrT & MILLER, FEDHence, statutory
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1966 (1972).
intervention is irrelevant for purposes of the present discussion on nonparties who purposely bypass an opportunity to intervene.
There are many procedural distinctions between intervention of right
and permissive intervention. For present purposes, however, it is important to note only that the former involves nonparties to existing litigation
who have a direct stake in the outcome of the litigation, while the latter
usually involves nonparties who need not, and usually do not, have a direct
personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the litigation. See, e.g., 7A
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1906-23
(1972). Hence, permissive intervenors will not have a reason to choose not
to try and intervene in existing litigation, since they will usually have no
direct stake in the outcome of the action. Intervenors of right, however,
may have several reasons for not exercising that right. See notes 62-71 and
accompanying text infra.
28. FED. R. Crv. P. 24, as amended, July 1, 1975.
29. Id.
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rather than in separate lawsuits.3 0 It is this last purpose, aimed
toward judicial economy, that becomes relevant for purposes of
the present discussion.
While FRCP 24(a) establishes the prerequisites for nonparties to intervene as of right, the rule does not address those
cases where a person who qualifies as a FRCP 24(a) plaintiffintervenor declines to exercise that right. 31 Thus, by bringing a
later action, the nonintervening plaintiff can wastefully prolong
the litigation in opposition to the purpose of the rule which gives
him a right to intervene.3 2 The doctrine of res judicata complicates this situation by affording protection to the absent plaintiff.

Res Judicataand the Rules of Merger and Bar
The doctrine of res judicata provides that where a final judgment has been rendered between two parties as to the merits of
a particular claim, relitigation of that same claim in the future
will not be allowed.33 A plaintiff who wins in the first action,
cannot later sue the same defendant for higher damages, because his prior action is merged into the judgment.3 4 Similarly,
if the plaintiff loses the first action, he is barred from later suing
again on the same claim.35 Hence, pleas of merger and bar
under the res judicata doctrine are defendant's pleas. 36 Once
having litigated a claim against a plaintiff, the defendant will not
7
have to relitigate that identical claim with the same plaintiffA
Under the res judicata doctrine, however, the defendant is
not protected from an absent plaintiff having an identical cause
of action as the plaintiff in the initial suit. If the absent plaintiff

30. See 1B

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

0.412(1), at 1812 (2d ed. 1980).

31. The rules are phrased in terms of defining those general situations
where a person may initiate joinder. The rules do not speak in terms of
what penalties, if any, apply for failure to join. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 addresses
those situations where a party who must be joined, cannot be joined. This
is as close as the joinder provisions of the federal rules come to addressing
issues of nonassertion of a right to join a pending action.
32. It is not likely a nonintervening plaintiff would forego his opportunity to intervene just to frustrate judicial economy. However, it is ironic
that the intervention rule can be used in such a manner.
33. Elder v. New York &Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 353, 31
N.E.2d 188, 189 (1940); Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14,
18, 9 N.E.2d 758, 759 (1937); McCoid, A Single Packagefor Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 709-10 (1976).
34. E.g., Dearden v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644 (1939). See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 45(a) (1942).
35. E.g., Thompson v. Washington Nat'l Bank, 68 Wash. 42, 122 P. 606
(1912). See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 45(b) (1942).
36. See Note, Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral
Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1013 (1967).
37. Id.
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does not intervene in the initial action between the plaintiff and
defendant, the rules of merger and bar have no effect on him. 38
Therefore, while res judicata helps to promote judicial economy
and protects a defendant against wasteful relitigation with the
same plaintiff, the doctrine does not protect the defendant
against subsequent relitigation due to recalcitrant nonparties
properly aligned as plaintiffs. Like res judicata, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is aimed toward judicial economy, but can
also leave a defendant unprotected from relitigation of previously decided claims and issues.
CollateralEstoppel
The Restatement of Judgments describes the legal effect of
collateral estoppel as follows: "[w] here a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different cause of

action ....

,39

The purpose of this doctrine is judicial economy

and finality.4° "Once a party has fought a matter in litigation
'4 1
with the other party, he cannot later renew that duel."
Res judicata only applies to the same cause of action, while
collateral estoppel applies to different causes of action. 42 Under
res judicata, a plaintiff is precluded from relitigating the same
cause of action against the same defendant, whether or not the
plaintiff won or lost in the prior action. 43 By contrast, collateral
estoppel is generally limited in application to those issues which
were essential to the judgment, and which were actually litigated and determined in the prior litigation."
While res judicata is a defendant's plea,45 collateral estoppel
may be successfully asserted by either a subsequent plaintiff or
defendant.4 6 Collateral estoppel may be asserted in a subsequent suit between the same parties on a different cause of action arising from the same transaction or occurrence that gave
38. Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N.Y. 159, 184 N.E. 744

(1933).
39. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942).
40. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599 (1948).

41. Id. at 597-98.
42. Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 346 Ill. 266, 178 N.E. 496 (1931).
43. E.g., Deardon v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N.E.2d 644 (1939). See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 45(a) (1942).
44. E.g., Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876). See RESTATE-

MENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(2) (1942).
45. E.g., United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236 (1924).
46. E.g., Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co., 346 Ill. 266, 178 N.E. 496
(1931).
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rise to the initial suit.47 If the cause of action in the second suit
is not barred by res judicata, 48 the assertion of collateral estoppel by either the plaintiff or defendant as to previously decided
issues will usually prove fatal to the nonmovant's case. The latter situation occurs when the issues decided in the first case are
determinative of the outcome in the second case. 49 Hence, collateral estoppel protects both parties from having to relitigate an
identical issue with the same adversary, 50 after each litigant has
had a full and fair opportunity to previously litigate the issue.
Where a nonparty to the prior litigation either asserts collateral estoppel or has the plea asserted against him, however, a
judicial distinction between "defensive collateral estoppel" and
"offensive collateral estoppel" has been made. 51 This distinction
gives rise to the present problem of nonintervening federal
plaintiffs. A nonparty can assert the plea of collateral estoppel,
but cannot have the plea asserted against him. 52 The consequences of this procedure are unfairness to the defendant in
multiple plaintiff cases and unnecessary litigation which burdens the federal courts. A closer examination of how this result
has been made possible follows.
47. Generally, where collateral estoppel is asserted in a subsequent suit
between the same parties, "[a]pplication of collateral estoppel conserves
judicial time and resources, protects a litigant from the unnecessary expense and potential harrassment of repetitive litigation, and avoids conflicting rights and duties that could result from inconsistent judgments." Note,
Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co.: Limitation of Collateral Estoppel in Products Liability Litigation, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 201, 201 n.1 (1980).
48. Collateral estoppel applies to those issues which were actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the prior litigation. Res judicata applies to all issues which were previously litigated and those issues which
might have been litigated. Additionally, under res judicata, a litigant cannot split his cause of action into separate lawsuits. Hence, res judicata prevents litigation of claims as well as issues that might have been litigated.
For example, a litigant who wins or loses a negligence action against his
opponent, cannot later bring a strict liability action against that same opponent, if both the negligence and strict liability claims arose from the same
transaction or occurrence. The litigant cannot split his cause of action. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. de-

nied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951); 1B

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

0.40511], at 622-24

(2d ed. 1980).
49. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464, 469-70 (3d
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951). If the issue determinative of liability was the same in two different cases, logically, upon assertion of collateral estoppel, a prior adjudication against the defendant would prove fatal
in the subsequent case also.
50. Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965).
51. See generally Note, Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of
CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967). See
notes 53-71 and accompanying text infra.
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 88 (Tent. Draft. No. 3,
1976).
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Assertion of Defensive CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty
Defendant: Defendant is Protectedfrom Relitigation

A plea of defensive collateral estoppel occurs when there
are two or more defendants potentially liable to one plaintiff on
an underlying claim involving the same issues. 53 The plaintiff
will sue one of the defendants. If he loses that action, he will
then attempt to bring a second suit against the remaining defendant. Until its recent demise, the "mutuality doctrine" would
have left the remaining defendant unprotected from the plaintiff's attempt to renew his claim by merely switching adversaries.

54

The mutuality doctrine states that a nonparty cannot assert
a favorable prior adjudication against a party because the prior
judgment, had it gone the other way, could not have been asserted against him.55 Therefore, the remaining defendant could
not point to the plaintiff's loss in the case set forth above and
attempt to bar the plaintiff's second suit on that basis. Since the
nonparty defendant to the plaintiff's first action could not be
bound by a judgment favoring the plaintiff in that action 56 under
the mutuality doctrine, the nonparty defendant cannot likewise
later assert a judgment favoring the defendant in the plaintiff's
57

first action.

53. Note, Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010, 1019 (1967).
54. The most persuasive attack on the mutuality doctrine came in Bern-

hard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust &Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d
892 (1942). Justice Traynor, speaking for a unanimous California Supreme
Court, stated, "[n]o satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the
requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a
party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend." Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at

895. In Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313 (1971), the Court further criticized the mutuality doctrine:
In any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is
forced to present a complete defense on the merits to a claim which the
plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in a prior action, there is an arguable
misallocation of resources. To the extent the defendant in the second
suit may not win by asserting, without contradiction, that the plaintiff
had fully and fairly, but unsuccessfully, litigated the same claim in the
prior suit, the defendant's time and money are diverted from alternative uses-productive or otherwise-to relitigation of a decided issue.
Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of
unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming
table or a lack of discipline and disinterestedness on the part of the
lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.

Id. at 329.
55. 1 FREEMAN,
56. Id.
57. Id.

JUDGMENTS

§ 428 (5th ed. 1925).
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The mutuality doctrine came under attack from courts in
most state and federal jurisdictions.5 8 The United States
Supreme Court recently approved of the major decisions that
abandoned the mutuality ri-quirement.5 9 As a result, defendants in federal courts are no longer subjected to wasteful relitigation in the defensive collateral estoppel cases. In such cases,
a defendant can effectively preclude a single plaintiff from relitigating identical issues, previously litigated and lost against another defendant, by asserting a plea of defensive collateral
60
estoppel.
The assertion of defensive collateral estoppel by a defendant has only recently met with United States Supreme Court approval. Nonparty defendants were finally allowed to assert a
defensive collateral estoppel plea against a single-party plaintiff,
because the judiciary realized "it was no longer tenable to afford
a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue."' 61 In those cases involving multiple
plaintiffs and a single defendant, however, a different branch of
collateral estoppel applies. The issue in those cases is whether
nonparty plaintiffs are allowed to estop a party defendant.
Under the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel, the sometimes unfortunate answer to that question has been in the affirmative.
Assertion of Offensive CollateralEstoppel by Nonparty
Plaintiffs: Defendant is Subjected to Relitigation of
Previously Decided Claims and Issues
The defensive use of collateral estoppel by a nonparty
involves a transaction which produces a single plaintiff and multiple defendants. 62 By contrast, the offensive assertion of col58. See, e.g., Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950); Ri-

ordon v. Ferguson, 147 F. 2d 983 (2d Cir. 1945); Portland Gold Mining Co. v.
Stratton's Independence, 158 F. 63 (8th Cir. 1907). See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
59. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1979) (implicitly
approving of the Bernhard and Blonder-Tongue decisions).
60. Id.

61. Id.

62. There are several types of cases that fit in this category, but the majority of these cases involve derivative liability. Examples of such cases include an employer whose driver has been involved in an automobile
accident while within the scope of the driver-employee's duties. In a suit
against the driver, whereupon the driver wins such suit, the plea of defensive collateral estoppel is available to the employer and has been effective
in a subsequent action against him. See Taylor v. Denton Hatchery, Inc.,
251 N.C. 689, 111 S.E.2d 864 (1960); accord, Carroll v. Hubay, 272 F.2d 767 (2d
Cir. 1959) (complaint against employer dismissed due to prior action
against employee resulting in verdict for employee). The reverse situation,

19811
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lateral estoppel involves a transaction which produces multiple
plaintiffs and a single defendant.6 3 Assuming only one of the
plaintiffs in the latter situation initiates a suit against the defendant, a losing verdict against the defendant will give rise to
the question of offensive assertion of collateral estoppel in a
subsequent action by another plaintiff. Under the offensive collateral estoppel doctrine, a nonparty plaintiff can estop the de64
fendant from relitigating the defendant's loss in the first suit.
The nonparty plaintiff seeks to avoid relitigating the issue of the
defendant's liability and wants to proceed directly to the issue
65
of damages.
While the defensive use of collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy by forcing the single plaintiff to join all potential
defendants in the initial lawsuit, 66 the offensive use of collateral

estoppel promotes exactly the opposite incentive. In the New
Jersey case of Reardon v. Allen,67 the problem was succinctly
defined:
To allow plaintiffs the benefit of the first judgment may actually increase litigation and delay in some cases. Claimants might be inspired to delay their personal injury actions in the hope that the
first action by another claimant produces a favorable result. Two
chances are better than one. The delay in bringing an action would
deprive courts of the opportunity to consolidate the actions on motion, or on the court's own initiative .... 68
The results in such situations are unfairness to the single
defendant and wasteful litigation. The reasons for this are twofold. First, if the defendant is successful in the first suit, the
nonparty plaintiffs are not bound under the rules of res judicata. 69 They can bring their own actions successively against
the defendant. The defendant is, therefore, subjected to relitiwhere the first action is against the employer and the subsequent action
against the driver-employee, has yielded the same results. See Davis v. Perryman, 225 Ark. 963, 286 S.W.2d 844 (1956); Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 277 Mass.
563, 179 N.E. 246 (1932).
63. The multiple plaintiff and single defendant lawsuit can arise in
many different situations and with a small or great number of plaintiffs. See
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968);
Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188
(1940) (lawsuit consisting of two plaintiffs, the owner and driver of a truck,
and the defendant, the owner of the other vehicle). Lawsuits involving
large numbers of plaintiffs and a single defendant usually involve an airplane crash, bus or train collisions, or devastating explosions. See Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1615 (1972).
64. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979).
65. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1460 (1968).
66. See notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra.
67. 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965).
68. Id. at 571-72, 213 A.2d at 32.
69. See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
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gating claims and issues he had previously defended. Second, a
defendant may have been found liable in the first action, but the
monetary compensation at stake may have been only minimal.
The subsequent action, however, may involve large sums of
money. Logically, the defendant would not defend against a
small claim as vigorously as he would against a large claim.
Having lost the prior suit, however, the defendant remains liable
to future plaintiffs. The issue of his liability cannot be relitigated in future suits. The only remaining issue is how much the
defendant is liable for.70 Thus, offensive collateral estoppel,
combined with the rules of res judicata, can subject the common
defendant to sequential trials, each of which threatens to impose liability but offers no immunity from future suits. This
loophole subjects the defendant to unfairness and burdens the
71
federal courts with unnecessary litigation.
Intervention, Res Judicata,and CollateralEstoppel:
A Summary
The underlying purposes of intervention, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel are judicial economy, judicial finality, and
fairness to all parties. 7 2 To the extent these devices are used to
effectuate joinder, or to estop a single plaintiff from successively
suing multiple defendants, as in the defensive collateral estoppel case, these purposes are accomplished. But the development of intervention, res judicata, and collateral estoppel in
cases involving a single defendant being sued successively by
multiple plaintiffs, has left the defendant subject to unfairness
and the federal courts subject to the possibility of wasteful relitigation.
Several methods, such as expansion of the res judicata doctrine,73 virtual representation,7 4 and stare decisis 75 have been
employed by the federal courts for correcting the problem of
70. Although this result seems obvious, it may not be anticipated by an
attorney engaging in a case which has collateral estoppel implications. See
note 65 and accompanying text supra. But see Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.

983 (1966) (where the second passenger's plea of collateral estoppel was
denied because "it would be unfair in this case").
71. See notes 33-38 and 62-70 and accompanying text supra.
72. See notes 26-71 and accompanying text supra.
73. This approach involves a privity theory. When the interest of a nonparty and a party to a pending action are substantially identical, and the
party representative vigorously protects that interest, the nonparty may be
bound by collateral estoppel on the theory that he was the privy of the party
representative. See Cortrell, The Expanding Scope of the Res JudicataBar,
54 TEx. L. REv. 527 (1976). The problem with a general application of this
approach has been the issue of adequacy of representation. See, e.g., Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 155-56
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nonintervening plaintiffs. These methods, however, have been
applied on an ad hoc basis and none of them are useful as a uniform approach for resolution of this problem in the federal
courts.7 6 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,77 offered one avenue of reform. Unfortunately, the Parklane decision is not likely to persuade
nonintervening plaintiffs to effectuate joinder in an existing ac(1967) (dissenting opinion discussing intervention of right and adequacy of
representation).
74. In Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975), two Florida state agencies leased a parcel of land to Aerojet-General. The contract contained a
provision allowing Aerojet to exercise an option to purchase the land. 511
F.2d at 713. When Aerojet exercised their option, the agencies refused to
convey the land. Aerojet brought an action for specific performance in federal district court. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Kirk, 318 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Fla.
1970), affd sub nom. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972). The federal district court ruled in
favor of Aerojet and ordered specific performance. Dade County, claiming a
statutory right to purchase the land, did not intervene in the first action, but
later petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to compel conveyance of the
land from the agencies to it. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710,
714 (5th Cir. 1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975). In
response, Aerojet brought a second federal action to enjoin the enforcement
of the Florida Supreme Court order. The federal district court estopped
Dade County from challenging their previous rulings in favor of Aerojet.
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 366 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Fla. 1973). The court
of appeals affirmed the district court. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511
F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908
(1975). The Aerojet litigation is significant since it relied on the doctrine of
virtual representation to come to a decision. Virtual representation requires that the interest of the absent party and the party representative be
so close that the party representative will be expected to adequately represent the absent party's interest. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940).
The actual quality of the representation is irrelevant. RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY §§ 181(b) (iii), 183-85 (1936). Additionally, the doctrine can only
be applied when, "as a practical matter, a final adjudication of rights is necessary for the orderly conduct of everyday affairs, even though it entails
foreclosure of an unknown person's claims." Hence, the virtual representation doctrine could not be generally applicable to multiple plaintiff cases in
federal civil litigation on due process grounds. See notes 116-25 and accompanying text infra.
75. Stare decisis is a doctrine which states, "when a court has once laid
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain set of facts, it will adhere
to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where the facts are substantially the same." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1557 (4th ed. 1951). While
the doctrine -has been effective to preclude relitigation of principles of law,
the results, when applied to preclude relitigation of facts, can be illogical.
See Western Elec. Co. v. Intersil, Inc., No. 76-0212-R (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 1978),
argued sub nom. Western Elec. Co. v. Teledyne, Inc., No. 78-1892 (4th Cir.
Dec. 5, 1979).
76. The remaining approaches are res judicata privity, compulsory intervention, and mandatory joinder. For an excellent discussion of these approaches and the negative aspects of each, see McCoid, A Single Package
for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 714-28 (1976).
77. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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tion and, thereby, avoid subjecting single defendants to the perils of the offensive collateral estoppel situation.
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S SOLUTION TO

RECALCITRANT FEDERAL PLAINTIFF INTERVENORSPARKLANE HOSIERY Co. V. SHORE: BARRING
THE USE OF OFFENSIVE

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The Facts and ProceduralHistory of Parklane
In Parklane, plaintiffs brought a stockholder's class action
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York against Parklane Hosiery Co. 78 The complaint alleged
that Parklane had issued a materially false and misleading
proxy statement, which led to a merger, and which caused Parklane's shareholders to sell their stock. 79 Damages, 80rescission of
the merger, and recovery of costs were demanded.
Before the class action came to trial, however, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an action in the
Southern District of New York against Parklane. 8' The complaint alleged that Parklane's proxy statement violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 The SEC requested an
injunction. 83 The district court found the proxy statement in violation of the Act as alleged. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,8 4 and Parklane did not appeal.
Plaintiffs in the class action then moved for partial summary
judgment against the defendants, asserting that the defendants
were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues resolved
in the SEC action. The district court denied the motion, but cer78. Certified as a class action Sept. 14, 1974 by Order dated May 2, 1975.
79. 439 U.S. at 324.
80. Id.
81. The Securities and Exchange Commission requested the trial court
to:

(i) enjoin defendants Parklane and Somekh from further violations of
the antifraud, proxy, and reporting provisions of the federal securities
laws, (ii) order the appointment of a Special Counsel armed with all

necessary powers and authority to make a determination as to the
proper value of Parklane's stock, and as to the proper mode and extent
of relief to be afforded public Parklane shareholders, (iii) order Park-

lane to amend its prior public filings with the Commission so as to cor-

rect and adequately disclose all material matters relating to Parklane's

financial and other affairs (iv) order the defendant Parklane to file a
Form 10K for the year ending September 30, 1975, and (v) order any
relief as the Court deems necessary and appropriate.
SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
82. Id. at 479.
83. Id.
84. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
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tified the question for appeal. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University
of Illinois Foundation,85 reversed. The Second Circuit ruled
that offensive use of collateral estoppel by the shareholders was
permissible in this case. Since Parklane conflicted with a ruling
Hill,86 the United States
by the Fifth Circuit in Rachal v.
87
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit in the Parklane shareholders' action. 88 The Court abandoned the mutuality requirement for assertions of collateral estoppel. 89 Although
the Blonder-Tongue case had partially addressed the mutuality
issue, no Supreme Court case had completely abandoned the
mutuality requirement until the Parklane decision. The
Supreme Court used a "fairness analysis" in deciding whether
to allow assertion of collateral estoppel in Parklane. Since the
Court felt it would be fair for the shareholders to estop Parklane
from relitigating the proxy statement issue, offensive assertion
of collateral estoppel was allowed. 90
The Implications of Parklane
Parklane involved a nonparty plaintiff (the shareholders)
simultaneously involved in another lawsuit, who asserted offensive collateral estoppel against a party defendant (Parklane).
This situation differs from those previously discussed in that the
shareholders did not sit back and wait for a determination in a
previously filed suit.9 1 Rather, the filing of the suit crucial to the
shareholders' plea of estoppel (the SEC action) was contemporaneous with their own lawsuit.92 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court recognized the potential for abuse of offensive collateral
estoppel in cases involving multiple plaintiffs and a single defendant, where no contemporaneous suits by the plaintiffs were
pending. 93 The Court felt Parklane presented a ripe controversy concerning the general area of collateral estoppel. Therefore, two principles of law were set forth.
The first principle established in Parklane was the abandonment of the mutuality requirement. 94 As noted earlier, lack
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

402 U.S. 313 (1971).
435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).

439 U.S. 322, 325 n.3 (1979).
439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id. at 326-28.
Id. at 337.
See notes 62-71 and accompanying text supra.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
Id.
Id. at 330.
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of mutuality promotes judicial economy and finality in cases involving assertion of defensive collateral estoppel. 95 Also noted
earlier, however, is the unfair situation a single defendant faces
when successively sued by multiple plaintiffs, after the abandonment of the mutuality doctrine. 96 Justice Stewart, writing
for the majority in Parklane, recognized this problem when he
noted:
Since a plaintiff will be able to rely on a previous judgment against
the defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and see"
attitude in the hope that the first
action by another plaintiff will
97
result in a favorable judgment.
Justice Stewart further noted that "[o Iffensive use of collateral estoppel will likely increase rather than decrease the total
amount of litigation, since potential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not intervening in the first
action." 98 In answering this problem, the Court established the
second principle of law which consisted of its statement that:
The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action, or where ...the application of
offensive collateral estoppel would be unfair to the defendant, a
trial99judge should not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.

The Court indicated its preference for offensive collateral
estoppel by noting, for the first time, the precise distinction between defensive and offensive use of collateral estoppel. 10 0 The
Court would prefer that, in some situations, offensive use of collateral estoppel be permitted. 1 1 In Parklane, application of offensive collateral estoppel by the shareholders seemed fair. 0 2
95. See notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra.
96. Id.
97. 439 U.S. at 330.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 331.
100. Until the Parklane decision no court had clearly distinguished between offensive and defensive use of collateral estoppel. The Parklane decision established that the Supreme Court wanted the distinctions between
the two different doctrines understood by the federal courts. Additionally,
the Court wanted the doctrines to be applied correctly in light of its recognition of the abandonment of the mutuality requirement. Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). One state court has held there was no
distinction between application of offensive and defensive collateral estoppel. B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195
(1967) (overruling Elder v. New York &Pa. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N.Y. 350,
31 N.E.2d 188 (1940) on the theory that there is no practical distinction between offensive and defensive assertion of collateral estoppel by a nonparty).
101. This was the result that was brought about in Parklane. Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
102. In Parklane,the Supreme Court considered whether application of
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But Parklane involved parties in contemporaneous litigation.
Where there are multiple plaintiffs successively suing a single
defendant, the Parklane analysis breaks down.
Barringthe Use of Offensive CollateralEstoppel:
An Unlikely Solution
The problem with barring the use of offensive collateral estoppel is that judicial economy and finality are not achieved if
the plaintiff could have easily intervened in the first action. If
the plaintiff in the second suit is denied the use of offensive collateral estoppel, the same issues which were already litigated
and lost by the defendant in the first suit must now be relitigated. 10 3 Moreover, if the Parklane approach was intended as
an incentive for a rule 24(a) intervenor to exercise his right of
intervention, it is unlikely this result will be reached.
First, suppose the potential plaintiff takes a "wait and see"
attitude hoping the trial court in his action will rule that he
could not have easily intervened. In this case, the plaintiff will
be able to assert offensive collateral estoppel even though he
might very well have intervened easily in the first action. Second, suppose the plaintiff is barred from using offensive collateral estoppel. There is nothing to prevent the plaintiff from
obtaining a transcript of the first trial and arguing the successful
strategy of the first plaintiff.'0 4 Furthermore, how does barring
the use of offensive collateral estoppel make it more fair for the
defendant? In the assertion of defensive collateral estoppel, the
defendants are protected from relitigating claims and issues
they had previously litigated. 0 5 Contrast this with the Supreme
Court's treatment of the offensive collateral estoppel issue in
Parklane. If offensive use of collateral estoppel is barred, the
defendant will still have to relitigate issues and claims he previously litigated, thereby subjecting the courts to wasteful relitigation.
The use of offensive collateral estoppel did justice between
the parties in Parklane. Unfortunately, the rule barring the offensive use of collateral estoppel should have been limited to
offensive collateral estoppel would be unfair to defendant Parklane. Due to
the seriousness of the actions taken by defendant Parklane and the lack of

reward to the plaintiffs should the application of offensive collateral estoppel be made, collateral estoppel was applied. 439 U.S. at 331-33.
103. This is precisely the situation sought to be avoided in cases involv-

ing multiple plaintiffs and a single defendant.
104. Although the case would be tried in front of a different judge or jury,

there is little doubt that having a transcript from the previous trial would
give the plaintiff a strong strategic advantage.
105. See notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra.
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the facts in the case, since it affords multiple plaintiffs with a
common claim against a single defendant no pragmatic reasons
to intervene in the initial action. Additionally, the Parklanerule
destroys the viability of approaches advanced by past commentators to correct the problem of nonintervening plaintiffs in federal civil litigation.
THE VIABILITY OF APPROACHES ADVANCED BY PAST
COMMENTATORS IN LIGHT OF PARKLANE

Past commentators, having recognized the problem a single
defendant encounters when being sued successively by multiple
plaintiffs, 0 6 advocated binding the absent disputants to the results of the initial litigation. 0 7 Under these preclusion theories, 10 8 if the absent disputant refuses a known and adequate
opportunity to intervene in the earlier action, he becomes bound
by the results of the litigation. 0 9 Binding absent disputants to
the results of the initial litigation would have the effect of resolving all claims by all parties in one lawsuit. If the defendant
loses, then the absent plaintiffs win. If the defendant wins, then
the absent plaintiffs lose. Before Parklane,"0 such approaches
were viable and seemed to be an effective solution to the prob106. These articles are addressed to any disputant who chooses not to
intervene when intervention could be easily accomplished. See Currie, Mutuality of Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN L. REV. 281
(1957) (analyzing the distinctions between offensive and defensive collateral estoppel); Semmel, CollateralEstoppel,Mutuality and Joinderof Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457 (1968) (advocating elimination of multiple
lawsuits by the class action and other joinder devices); Touton, Preclusion
of Absent Disputantsto Compel Intervention, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1551 (1979)
(advocating binding absent disputants to the results of prior litigation);
Vestal, Rational of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 29 (1964) (analysis of the
various devices effective for use in preclusion of nonparties to an action
who fail to act on an opportunity to effectuate joinder); Comment, Nonparties and Preclusion by Judgment. The Privity Rule Reconsidered, 56 CALIrF.
L. REV. 1098 (1968) (advocating mandatory intervention in certain situations); Comment, The Expanding Scope of the Res Judicata Bar, 54 Tzx. L.
REV. 527 (1976) (examining the increasing application of res judicata to prevent wasteful relitigation); Note, The Impacts of Assertion of Defensive and
Offensive CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010
(1967) (intensive analysis of the law of collateral estoppel with mention of
the necessity of legislative enactment of rules to eliminate wasteful relitigation).
107. See note 106 supra.
108. On the use of preclusion devices, see McCoid, A Single Packagefor
Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707 (1976).
109. In other words, the theory being advocated was mandatory intervention (although not so labeled) in the literal sense. The absent party must
join the litigation or be bound by the results. See, e.g., Touton, Preclusionof
Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 COLUM. L REV. 1551 (1979).
110. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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lem. Since Parklane, however, preclusion theories of that kind
become illogical.
The reason preclusion theories and the Parklane decision
are not compatible is that the latter would cancel out the former.
Assume that an absent nonparty plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to intervene in an earlier lawsuit, but chose not to do
so. Further, assume that the defendant loses in that lawsuit.
Under the preclusion theory, the absent nonparty plaintiff
would be bound by the result and thus would win. Under the
Parklane rule, however, the nonparty plaintiff cannot make use
of the prior judgment against the defendant because the nonparty plaintiff could have easily intervened in the earlier action. 1 ' Hence, the Supreme Court, having recognized offensive
and defensive collateral estoppel in Parklane, is not likely to
later rule in a manner that would totally destroy both of those
doctrines. Ruling in favor of preclusion would represent too radical a departure from the Parklane decision. Therefore, precluding absent plaintiffs in the manner discussed previously is no
longer viable in light of Parklane.
What is more likely is a future ruling extending the Parklane rationale. Since the Supreme Court recognized both forms
of collateral estoppel in Parklane,112the next logical step would
be an extension of the collateral estoppel doctrine in favor of a
single defendant subject to the possibility of successive lawsuits
by multiple plaintiffs.
EXPANSION OF THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE IN FAVOR
OF A DEFENDANT AS A BASIS FOR RESOLVING ALL
POTENTIAL CLAIMS IN ONE LAwsurr

Multiple plaintiffs who can easily intervene in federal civil
litigation, but who opt not to do so, should be subjected to a second form of defensive collateral estoppel." 3 Under this approach, if the circumstances are such" 4 that (1) the absent
plaintiffs should intervene in the initial action, (2) they are
111. Id. at 331.
112. 439 U.S. at 330-31.

113. As noted earlier, the existing form of defensive collateral estoppel
occurs where two defendants are potentially liable to a single plaintiff. See
notes 53-61 and accompanying text supra. In those situations, however, the
plaintiff, against whom defensive collateral estoppel is being asserted has
already had his day in court. Under the present approach, the multiple
plaintiffs against whom defensive collateral estoppel may be potentially asserted will not have had a day in court.
114. There are several existing tests which may be used to determine if
the circumstances warrant intervention in the initial action. One example
is the test provided in FED. R. Crv. P. 24(b) (2) for permissive intervention.
Under that test, the circumstances justifying intervention will exist when
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aware of the action, (3) they refuse to join, and (4) the defendant prevails in the initial action, the absent plaintiffs should be
collaterally estopped by the defendant from relitigating any
identical issues in a later action by the plaintiffs.1 15 In order for
the plaintiffs to be estopped from relitigating the previously litigated issues, however, the plaintiffs must have been afforded
16
due process of law.
there are common questions of law or fact between the initial action and the
potential actions of the absent plaintiffs.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) addresses those situations where an absent party
is needed for a just adjudication. Under rule 19(a):
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete
relief cannot be accorded those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of
the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistant obligations by reason of his
claimed interest. If he has not been joined, the court shall order that he
be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he
may be made a defendant, or in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.
It therefore follows that in any situation wherein an absent party properly
aligned as a plaintiff is not joined under rule 19(a), the procedure being
advocated herein (assertion of a second form of defensive collateral estoppel) should be implemented. This would have the effect of eliminating the
court's determination of whether or not the action should proceed in the
party's absence as per FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
A final example of a test for mandating intervention was advocated by
one commentator. Under this approach,
(a) (1) Where the claim of a nonparty is based on the same transaction
as the claim of a party to an action; and (2) the interests of the claimants are not adverse; and (3) the nonparty has notice of the action; and
(4) joinder of both claims in the same action would result in a substantial saving of time and expense; then the nonparty will be bound by the
judgment in the action.
Comment, Nonparties and Preclusion by Judgment: The Privity Rule Reconsidered, 56 CAuF. L. REV. 1098, 1122 (1968). The proposed criterion goes on
to state those situations where the above rules will not apply. Notably, this
is the major defect in such a r'le. The idea behind any approach which
seeks to achieve judicial finality and economy should leave no fair and constitutional alternative other than joinder of all claims in one action. See
notes 117-33 and accompanying text infra.
115. Logically, the question of whether assertion of this second form of
defensive collateral estoppel will be allowed will occur when the absent
plaintiffs do not join, the defendant wins in the initial action, and the absent
plaintiffs try to sue the defendant in a later action claiming immunity from
the defendant's prior victory under the res judicata doctrine. The issues
fully litigated in the prior action will usually be determinative of the outcome in any future actions since the absent plaintiff's claims are based on
the same series of events which gave rise to the initial action. See notes 4849 and accompanying text supra.
116. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
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In all civil actions, due process requires that before a person
can be deprived of property by judicial decree, he must have had
notice of the action 1 7 and an opportunity to be heard." 8 To satisfy this requirement, the court should instruct the defendant to
notify all potential plaintiffs in the action. 1 9 Such notice should
contain the name of the action, the court where the action was
brought, the docket number, the names of the attorneys involved and where they may be reached, and a separate copy of
the pleadings. 120 The notice will advise the potential plaintiffs
that a hearing will be held allowing these plaintiffs to demon121
strate why intervention in the action would not be easy.
After the potential plaintiffs present arguments or evidence
to the court as to why it would not be easy to intervene, 122 formal notice of the results of the hearing should be sent to the
potential plaintiffs. 123 If the court decides that intervention
would be easy,' 24 the potential plaintiffs should be advised that
if the defendant prevails in the action and the potential plaintiffs
do not intervene in any future suits, the potential plaintiffs will
be effectively subjected to defensive collateral estoppel by the
117. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)

(due process encompasses at least timely notice and an opportunity to be
heard); 1 B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[11, at 1252 (1974).
118. Id.
119. Since the defendant will receive the benefit of the second form of
defensive collateral estoppel, it may be equitable to require him, rather
than the plaintiff, to notify all potential plaintiffs of the existing action. Ascertaining the names of the potential plaintiffs may not be very difficult nor
more burdensome than that which is required by current federal law. FED.
R. Civ. P. 19(c) requires "a pleading asserting a claim for relief [to] state
the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons . . . who are not joined,
and the reasons why they are not joined."
120. The defendant should make sure that all relevant information is
transmitted to the absent plaintiffs so that a later objection to the assertion
of the second form of defensive collateral estoppel does not fail on grounds
of insufficient notice.
121. The standard for whether offensive use of collateral estoppel is to be
allowed in a later action is whether the "absent plaintiffs could have easily
intervened in the initial action." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
331 (1979) (emphasis added). In accordance with Parklane,the standard at
the hearing for determining whether a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs should
later be subjected to estoppel should be the same; i.e., whether they can
easily intervene in the initial action.
122. It is to be noted, however, that due process does not require the
plaintiff's actual presence at such a hearing. The plaintiff may waive the
right to be heard by failure to appear at the hearing. As long as the plaintiff
or group of plaintiffs had the opportunity to be heard, due process is satisfied. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 278 (1876).
123. The procedure for the giving of notice is well established in the federal courts by class action litigation. See Annot., 32 A.L.R. Fed. 102 (1977).
Hence, no new burdens are imposed on the federal courts in the form of the
notice requirement.
124. See note 131 infra.
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defendant as to any previously litigated issues present and identical in the later actions.
Under this approach, the absent but potential plaintiffs have
notice of the existing action and an opportunity to be heard as to
why they cannot easily intervene. Since this procedure satisfies
due process, no federal district court should be allowed to prevent the defendant, in later actions, from asserting defensive
collateral estoppel on constitutional grounds. 125 With the due
process obstacle removed, several desirable effects become possible.
First, Parklane requires the trial court to determine
whether the plaintiff attempting to use offensive collateral estoppel in a later action could have easily intervened in the initial
action. 126 Under this new approach, that determination is also
required. Hence, no greater burden is placed on the trial court
than is required by current law. Second, if the trial court determines that the potential plaintiffs could have easily intervened,
but the potential plaintiffs opt not to do so, the initial action will
most likely end the litigation whether the defendant wins or
loses. If the defendant wins, he can assert the second form of
defensive collateral estoppel in any later actions and the plaintiffs will be foreclosed from relitigating any previously decided
issues. 127 If the defendant loses, the absent plaintiffs will not be
able to later assert offensive collateral estoppel against the defendant, because under Parklane,the ability to easily intervene
bars such assertion. 128 This leads to the question of whether allowing the assertion of the second form of defensive collateral
estoppel will accomplish judicial economy and finality. Since a
loss by the defendant in the initial suit will result in subsequent
relitigation by the absent plaintiffs, how will judicial economy
and finality be achieved? The answer to that question lies in the
third benefit from the defendant's power to assert a second form
of defensive collateral estoppel in later actions. As a practical
matter, if all potential plaintiffs with a common claim against the
defendant did not join in the initial action, 129 they would risk
125. The procedure described also includes notice of the possible threats
to the absent plaintiffs' interest should they fail to intervene. Such notice is
required. See Brenner v. Ebbert, 398 F.2d 762, 765 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 926 (1968).

126. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).

127. Instead of being immune to the defendant's victory under the res
judicata doctrine, the absent plaintiffs, having bypassed an adequate opportunity to intervene, are prevented from relitigating any identical issue in
their own claims.
128. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
129. Although the absent plaintiffs are left with the choice (after a hearing in which a determination is made that such intervention can easily be
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being estopped from asserting their claims against the defendant in the future, without ever having had a chance to formally
present them. 130 Hence, if the potential plaintiffs wish to litigate
their claims, they will have a strong incentive to join in the initial action. Without effectuating joinder, the chance to litigate
their claims may never occur.
Under the extension of the defensive collateral estoppel approach, multiple plaintiffs with a common claim against a single
defendant would pragmatically be facing mandatory intervention. Unless the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate to the court
that intervention would be burdensome, or the court decides
that intervention would violate sound judicial principles, 13 1 the
threat of later assertion of defensive collateral estoppel by the
defendant provides a forceful method whereby all potential
claims of all potential parties are tried in one lawsuit. Since the
accomplished) as to whether or not to intervene, the choice is limited by the
fact that no practical advantage is gained from nonintervention. See note
130 and accompanying text infra.
130. That is, the possibility that the defendant may win in the initial action coupled with the lack of any advantage by failing to intervene will
likely force the absent plaintiffs to effectuate intervention. Should the absent plaintiffs choose not to intervene, the defendant's victory in the initial
action would prevent the absent plaintiffs from having a day in court.
Seemingly, with no advantages to outweigh this possibility, that risk would
be too great to take.
131. Several considerations are relevant in this determination by the
court. First, plaintiffs have traditionally had the right to control the time
and place of their own lawsuit. Second, the court must consider whether
intervention by the absent plaintiffs would decrease, rather than increase,
judicial efficiency and management of the lawsuit. Third, consideration
must be given to subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, service
of process, and venue. An excellent discussion of these issues in a context
different from, but applicable to the present discussion, appears in Touton,
Preclusion of Absent Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
1551, 1568-76 (1979) (limitations on the court's power to hear actions are not
significant barriers to binding absent disputants to the results of the initial
litigation, although in some instances may limit the preclusion of absent
disputants).
Further, although other methods of consolidating the claims of absent
plaintiffs are not superior to allowing assertion of a second form of defensive collateral estoppel by the single defendant, the court may wish to consider such other methods. These would include the imposition of a
plaintiff's class action on the absent plaintiffs by the defendant, where the
number of plaintiffs involved number twenty-five or greater. Typically,
mass accidents give rise to such considerations. See Bernstein, Judicial
Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 349 (1978) (advocating use of
the class action device in mass actions on the theory that judicial economy
is promoted); Comment, The Use of Class Actions for Mass Accident Litigation, 23 Loy. L. REV. 383 (1977) (class actions are desirable for mass accident litigation). Other such alternatives where plaintiffs number less than
twenty-five may include joinder, Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968), transfer and consolidation under FED. R. Crv. P. 42(a),
transfer for coordinated pretrial under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970), or pretrial
settlement.
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defendant would be assured of only one lawsuit and the plaintiffs would be unable to wastefully prolong the litigation, this
procedure would give a more realistic meaning to the purposes
of the joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 132 and to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; i.e., judicial economy and finality and fairness to all parties
133
involved or potentially involved in the litigation.
CONCLUSION

In Chase NationalBank v. City of Norwalk,13 4 Justice Brandeis stated that "unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment
recovered therein will not affect his legal rights."'13 5 The increasing caseloads in the federal courts, the manner in which res judicata and collateral estoppel have developed, and the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have made it necessary
to summon multiple plaintiffs with a common claim against a
single defendant into one lawsuit or risk having their legal rights
affected. Allowing the later assertion of a second form of defensive collateral estoppel in such situations, wherein the plaintiffs'
due process rights are safeguarded, compliments the decision in
ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore and supports the principles of judicial economy and finality. Since Parklane attempted to force
multiple plaintiffs to intervene in one action, it is likely a future
ruling will fully accomplish that purpose. Expansion of the defensive collateral estoppel doctrine provides a viable method for
eliminating splintered litigation.
Michael C. Sachs

132. FED. R. Crv. P.13(h), 14(a)(b), 18(a)(b), 19(a)(b), 20(a), 22, 23, and
24. Ford Motor Credit Co.v.Beard,45 F.R.D. 523 (D.S.C. 1968) (spirit of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates avoidance of circuity or multiplicity of litigation).
133. See notes 33-52 and accompanying text supra.
134. 291 U.S. 431 (1934).
135. 291 U.S. at 441.

